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VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS ON PRICE, TERRITORY AND
CUSTOMERS-THE CERTAINTY OF UNCERTAINTY*
RICHARD W. POGUEt
Although a substantial part of the dollar volume of manufac-
turers is accounted for by sales made directly to commercial or con-
sumer users, a more significant source of federal antitrust lore is the
area of distribution systems in which manufacturers sell (typically,
"consumer products") either to resellers, or through business entities
designated as consignees or agents. The scope and application of anti-
trust doctrines relating to vertical restrictions in such distribution
are unclear and require frequent review. To date Supreme Court
opinions in this field have tended to contract the area of permitted
use of such restrictions, but have always left open substantial ques-
tions for the future.
There are many types of restrictions which are agreed to by, or
are imposed on, those downstream in the vertical distribution pat-
tern (i.e., distributors, dealers, consignees and agents) who sell to
the ultimate consumer.' The restrictions discussed here are those
most frequently dealt with in the cases: restrictions on (1) the prices
at which the marketer sells the goods, (2) the geographic area in
which he sells or solicits sales of the goods and (3) the categories of
customers to whom he sells or of whom he solicits sales of the goods.
Cases involving the latter two categories almost invariably have
involved some element of the first category-restrictions affecting
price.
Resale price maintenance was one of the earliest issues consid-
ered by the Supreme Court under the Sherman Act, whereas re-
strictions on territory and customer were not squarely treated
by the Court until the 1960's. Yet even in the area of re-
sale price maintenance, despite many decisions, intervening legisla-
tion and abundant literature dealing with the subject in the half
century since the Dr. Miles decision in 1911,2 there is considerable
uncertainty with respect to the scope and application of the resale
* Based on an address before the antitrust division of the Ohio State Bar Asso-
ciation, Dayton, Ohio, May 12, 1967, substantially revised in light of the decision in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), decided June 12, 1967.
t Member of the firm of Jones, Day, Cockley & Reavis, Cleveland, Ohio,
I For a discussion of restrictions on a purchase "for use only," see Note, Restricted
Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARv. L. Rv. 795, 821-22, 831
(1962).
2 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 873 (1911). For
historical treatment of, and bibliography on, resale price maintenance see S. OrmN-
HEIM & G. IVs-roN, FEDERAL ANTI-TRUsT LAws Ch. 9.
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price maintenance principles enunciated in the leading cases.
The antitrust history of vertical resale restrictions is tiresome
to those who have been through it, and perhaps depressing to many
manufacturers concerned with orderly marketing of their goods. But
any discussion of the subject of vertical restrictions necessarily re-
quires a brief recitation of this history. Ten leading cases demon-
strate the long legal history of efforts to justify such restrictions and
of the persistent tightening of the limitations on their use by the
Supreme Court after 1919.
(1) The Dr. Miles cases grew out of an action by a manufac-
turer (Dr. Miles) against a price-cutting wholesaler seeking to en-
join the latter from inducing other wholesalers or retailers to breach
their written agreements with Dr. Miles not to sell to any reseller
other than "designated Retail Agents." The Dr. Miles system of dis-
tribution was designed "to maintain certain prices fixed by it for
all the sales of its products both at wholesale and retail."4 Dr. Miles
argued that the agreements were consignment or agency contracts
under which it properly controlled prices at which wholesalers and
retailers sold as its agents. 5 The Supreme Court construed the bill
of complaint as attacking purchases by defendant from purchasers
from the consignees or agents, and thereby held the distribution
system invalid under common law and Sherman Act principles. After
noting that the resale price maintenance provisions of the agree-
ments were not analogous to those permitted in the case of a sale of
good will because the manufacturer had not parted with any interest
in its business, the Court mentioned the asserted justification for the
restriction-that confusion and damage result where sales at less than
standard retail prices are made. The Court reasoned that the advan-
tage of such a standard retail price primarily concerned the dealers,
not the manufacturer. Since agreements between or among dealers
to maintain the price would be illegal, thought the court, "tie com-
3 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
4 Id. at 394. Although technically the case presented an issue of the validity of
contractual restrictions on the categories of resellers to whom the wholesalers or re-
tailers could sell, the real thrust of the case was the resale price maintenance s)stem.
5 Under the wholesale consignment contract, "Said Consignee agrees to confine
the sale of all goods and products of the said Proprietor [Dr. Miles] strictly to and
to sell only to the designated Retail Agents of said Proprietor as specified in lists of
such Retail Agents furnished by said Proprietor...." and "at not less than the
following prices." Id. at 376, 378. Under the Retail Agency Contract the drugstore
agreed not to sell "to wholesale or Retail dealers not accredited agents of" Dr. Miles
and agreed "in no case to sell or furnish the said Proprietary Medidnes to any
person, firm or corporation whatsoever, at less than the full retail price as printed
on the packages." Id. at 380.
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plainant [Dr. Miles] can fare no better." The sweeping language of
the Court was not limited to the facts before it:
[W]here commodities have passed into the channels of trade
and are owned by dealers, the validity of agreements to prevent
competition and to maintain prices is not to be determined by
the circumstance whether they were produced by several manu-
facturers or by one, or whether they were previously owned by
one or by many. The complainant having sold its product at
prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever
advantage may be derived from competition in the subsequent
traffic.7
(2) The Colgate case8 turned on the construction of an indict-
ment. The trial court construed it as not charging that the manu-
facturer had entered into agreements with its wholesale and retail
customers, but rather as charging a combination of the manufac-
turer and its wholesale and retail customers. Thus the indictment
was construed as charging that "The retailer, after buying, could, if
he chose, give away his purchase; or sell it at any price he saw fit, or
not sell it at all; his course in these respects being affected only by
the fact that he might by his action incur the displeasure of the
manufacturer, who could refuse to make further sales to him, as he
had the undoubted right to do."9 In affirming the judgment sus-
taining a demurrer to the indictment, the Court set forth its famous
statement:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the Act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.10
(3) One year later in the Schrader's case"1 the Court struck
down a resale price maintenance system and affirmed the distinction
between the Dr. Miles and Colgate opinions:
It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the obvious difference12
0 Id. at 408.
7 Id. at 408-09. The Court accordingly affirmed an appellate judgment affirming
a dismissal of the bill on demurrer for want of equity.
8 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
9 Id. at 805-06.
10 Id. at 07. Pertinent to later cases were the averments in the bill of complaint
in Colgate that the defendant had engaged in many enforcement activities including
"requests to offending dealers for assurances and promises of future adherance to
prices, which were often given." Id. at 303.
11 United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
12 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (footnote added).
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between the situation presented when a manufacturer merely
indicates his wishes concerning prices and declines further deal-
ings with all who fail. to observe them, and one where he enters
into agreqments - whether express or implied from a course of
dealing or other ciicumstances - with all customers thioughout
the different States which undertake to bind them to observe
fixed resale prices. (Emphasis added.) 1s
(4) In the Old Dutch Cleanser case, 14 decided the year after
the Schrader's decision, the Court noted that the opinion of the
Court inSchrader's "distinctly stated that the essential agreement,
combination or conspiracy might be implied from a course of dealing
or other circumstances,"15 and held that this issue was a question of
fact for determination by the jury.
(5) The fourth of these consecutive year cases, the Beech-Nut
case,1.6 became the source of great discussion in the journals for the
next generation. That case, reversing a judgment based on the Col-
gate case, upheld as modified an FTC order to cease and desist is-
sued under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Beech-
Nut had not entered into resale price agreements, but it had used
elaborate cooperative and coercive tactics to enforce its program (re-
porting names of noncomplying dealers, causing dealers' names to
be placed on lists of undesirable purchasers, reinstating customers
previously cut off for cutting prices upon assurances to sell at sug-
gested prices and to refuse to sell to price cutters, using numbers
and symbols to trace noncomplying dealer sales, etc.). These prac-
tices were said to suppress freedom of competition by methods
"which are quite as effectual as agreements express or implied in-
tended to accomplish the same purpose"' 7 and were held to be un-
fair methods of competition.
13 United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920). The Court
reversed a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the indictment; the district court had
sustained the demurrer reluctantly, forestating a problem of much subsequent litiga-
tion: "Personally, and with all due respect ... I can sec no real difference upon the
facts between [Dr. Miles and Colgate]. The only difference is that in the former the
arrangement for marketing its product was put in writing, whereas in the latter the
wholesale and retail dealers observed the prices fixed by the vendor. This is a dis-
tinction without a difference. The tacit acquiescence of the wholesalers and retailers
in the prices thus fixed is the equivalent for all practical purposes of an express
agreement ... ' Id. at 97.
14 Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
15 rd. at 210.
16 FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
17 Id. at 455. Commenting on the Dr. Miles-Colgate.Beech-Nut line of cases, Pro-
fessor Chaffee concluded forty years ago that "It may be conjectured that the present
legal confusion is not really due to an absence of dear thinking but only corresponds
to the complicated interlacing of economic factors in a field where definite rules are
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(6) The Bausch & Lomb case' in 1944 held invalid a plan
whereby, according to the Court, the wholesalers in question "ac-
cepted Soft-Lite's proffer of a plan of distribution by cooperating
in prices, limitation of sales to, and approval of, retail licensees .... "
The Court, after holding that Soft-Lite had conspired and combined
with some of the wholesalers "by designating selected wholesalers as
sub-distributors of Soft-Lite products, by fixing resale prices and by
limiting the customers of the wholesalers to those recommended by
the wholesalers and approved by Soft-Lite . . ." vaguely opined
that "[w]hether this conspiracy and combination was achieved by
agreement or by acquiescence of the wholesalers coupled with as-
sistance in effectuating its purpose is immaterial."'1 Two other as-
pects of the Bausch & Lomb case had very significant influences on
later developments: first, the Court upheld in a 4-4 decision the
manufacturer's agreement not to sell to Soft-Lite's competitors;
second, the Court included a statement in the opinion relating to
Soft-Lite's marketing system-that apart from fair trade a seller "may
not lawfully limit by agreement, express or implied, the price at
which or the persons to whom its purchaser may resell .... -20
(7) Then came the infusion of perhaps the greatest confusion
sixteen years later with the decision of the Court in Parke, Davis.2 1
There the Court reversed the dismissal of the complaint on two
grounds. First, the Court concluded that Parke, Davis had exceeded
the permissible bounds of Colgate because it had not merely an-
nounced its policy regarding retail prices and followed this with a
"simple" refusal to deal with any retailers who disregarded the pol-
icy. Rather, it had refused to deal with wholesalers "in order to
elicit their willingness to deny Parke, Davis products to retailers
and thereby help gain the retailers' adherence to its suggested mini-
mum retail prices." The Court found that the wholesalers cut off
price-cutting retailers when Parke, Davis furnished the names of the
offenders. This course of conduct the Court said went beyond a mere
Colgate-authorized announcement of policy and refusal to deal and
perhaps impossible. Whatever solution of the price-control problem is adopted, It
seems pretty sure to be unsatisfactory." Chaffee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels,
41 HAg,. L. Rav. 945, 992 (1928).
18 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
19 Id. at 723. Much reliance was later placed on this language of the opinion
by the government in attacking customer restrictions. But, as indicated, the heart
of the case was the Court's conclusion that there was present "an agreement between
the seller and purchaser to maintain resale prices," Id. at 721; the price fixing was
"an integral part of the whole distribution system," Id. at 720.
20 Id. at 721.
21 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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resulted in a combination of Parke, Davis with the retailers and
wholesalers to maintain retail prices in violation of the Act. Second,
the Court condemned the course of conduct engaged in by Parke,
Davis with respect to suspension of price advertising. The Court
concluded that Parke, Davis had been advised by Dart Drug, a re-
tailer which had been advertising cut prices, that Dart would be
willing to "go along," and that Parke, Davis had then approached
other retailers and "Dart's apparent willingness to cooperate was
used as the lever to gain their acquiescence in the program." Parke,
Davis, "having secured those acquiescences," so reported to Dart
and the advertising was suspended. The Court characterized this as
concerted action induced by Parke, Davis and stated that under such
circumstances "The manufacturer is thus the organizer of a price-
maintenance combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman
Act."22
(8) Even more revolutionary in the sweep of some of its lan-
guage was Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Simpson v.
Union Oil Co.23 There the Court in effect granted summary judg-
ment to the treble damage plaintiff on the question of violation on
the ground that the price setting provisions of Union Oil's one year
consignment contracts, used in conjunction with its one-year leases
with its service station dealer-lessees amounted to unlawful resale
price maintenance. Although the case has been distinguished on a
number of grounds, the language of the opinion was unrestrained:
When... a "consignment" device is used to cover a vast gas-
oline distribution system, fixing prices through many retail out-
lets, the antitrust laws prevent calling the "consignment" an
agency, for then the end result of [the Socony Vacuum case24
making horizontal price-fixing arrangements per se unlawful]
would be avoided merely by clever manipulation of words, not
by differences in substance. The present, coercive "consignment"
device, if successful against challenge under the antitrust laws,
furnishes a wooden formula for administering prices on a vast
scale.25
The Court did not follow its decision upholding price control
clauses in consignment agreements in the General Electric case.26
22 Id. at 46-47.
23 377 US. 13 (1964).
24 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 310 US. 150 (1940).
25 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 US. 13, 21-22 (1964) (emphasis supplied.)
The significance of the word "coercive" has variously been dismissed or considered
critical. Compare Rahl, Control of an Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case - A Study
in Antitrust Analysis, 61 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 1, 8-9 (1966) with Handler, The Twentieth
Annual Antitrust Review - 1967,53 VA. L. REv. 1667, 1686-87 (1967).
26 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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The General Electric case was apparently distinguished on the
ground that it involved products covered by patents.
All of the foregoing cases essentially involved restrictions on
prices at which-persons at the retail level would sell to the public.
The only Supreme Court decisions dealing at any length with verti-
cal Trestrictions on geographical territories or classes of customers
were relatively recent-White Motor27 in 1963 and Schwinn2 8 ,i4
1967.
(9) White Motor, involved- what Mr. Justice Clark in dissent
characterized as "one of the most brazen violations of the Sherman
Act that I have experienced in a quarter of a century."20 The gov-
ernment contended that contract provisions that a distributor would
not sell trucks, except to persons having a place of business and/or
purchasing headquarters in a defined territory, and would not sell or
authorize its dealers to sell trucks to any governmental body, were
per se violations of the Sherman Act. The defendant asserted a num-
ber of reasons why the territory and customer clauses were necessary
and proper. The Court, reversing a summary judgment for the gov-
ernment and sending the case back for trial, reasoned that since this
was the first case "involving a territorial restriction in a vertical ar-
rangement," 30 it knew "too little of the actual impact,"81 of the
two types of restrictions, or of the "economic and business stuff out
of which these arrangements emerge," 82 to decide whether they
should be classified as per se restraints, even though the district court
had found that the contracts also fixed resale prices, a ruling from
which the defendant did not appeal.
(10) Four years later a somewhat similar case reached the Court;
by this time the Court apparently felt that it did have the requisite
knowledge 'to invalidate territorial and customer restrictions on re-
sellers. In Schwinn83 the Court was presented with a distribution
program in which, in essence, three methods were used: sales to
distributors who resold to retailers, sales to retailers by means of
27 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
28 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co2., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
-29 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 276 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
The subsequent consent decree, reprinted at 1964 TADE CAs. 1 71,195 (ND. Ohio
1964) enjoined the defendant from entering into "any contract, combination, agree.
ment or understanding, with any distributor, dealer, or any other person to limit,
allocate or restrict the territories in which, or the persons or classes of persons to
whom, any distributor, dealer or other person may sell trucks."
80 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261.
31 Id. at 263.
32 Yd.
as United Stites v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1067).
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consignment or agency arrangements with distributors, and sales to
retailers under the "Schwinn plan" under which Schwinn made di-
rect shipments to retailers with Schwinn invoicing the retailer and
extending credit and then paying a commission to the distributor
who took the order. Schwinn assigned specific territories "which
were allocated on an exclusive basis" to each distributor and in-
structed it to sell only to franchised Schwinn accounts and only in
the assigned territory. The district court, after a lengthy trial, had
prohibited Schwinn from requiring that distributors who purchased
from Schwinn resell only in their assigned territories,34 but upheld
the restriction where the consignment or agency or Schwinn plan
method was used and upheld customer restrictions under all three
methods of distribution. A major charge of the government-that
Schwinn required retailers to adhere to retail prices designated by
Schwinn-was rejected by the district court.
Only the government appealed. It did not appeal the part of
the decision finding defendants innocent of price fixing. In its argu-
ments on appeal the government sought to have the decree enlarged
in two major respects-first, to prohibit territorial restrictions on
distributors in consignment, agency and Schwinn plan transactions
as well as resale transactions; and, second, to prohibit customer re-
strictions in arrangements with distributors or retailers regardless
of the form of the transaction. The government prevailed in its at-
tack on customer restrictions in resale transactions but otherwise
lost the appeal.
The Supreme Court, acknowledging that it was concerned with
a truly vertical arrangement, 5 began its legal analysis by looking to
the "specifics of the challenged practices and their impact upon the
marketplace in order to make a judgment as to whether the restraint
is or is not 'reasonable' .... ,,80 But somehow the Court concluded
that "where a manufacturer sells products to his distributors subject
to territorial restrictions upon resale, a per se violation of the Sher-
man Act results [and that] the same principle applies to restrictions
of outlets with which the distributors may deal and to restraints
34 This injunctive relief was granted on the basis of the district court's holding
that Schwinn and certain distributors had entered into a horizontal aggreement to
allocate the territories of those distributors. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
2S7 F. Supp. 523, 342 (N.D. II. 1965).
35 "These are not horizontal restraints, in which the actors are distributors
with or without the manufacturer's participation." United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967). Here the Court cited United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). The Court also emphasized that it did not have a case
"of territorial or dealer restrictions accompanied by price fixing." Id. at 373.
36 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 US. 365, 374 (1967).
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upon retailers to whom the goods are sold."'8 7 But where consign-
ment, agency or Schwinn plan type restrictions were involved, the
Court went on to hold that "it is only if the impact of the confine-
ment is 'unreasonably' restrictive of competition that a violation of
section 1 results.... , 8, The Court upheld the reasonableness of the
restrictions in the latter types of transactions on the facts of the
Schwinn record, noting that Schwinn had retained "all indicia of
ownership, including title, dominion, and risk" and citing as "criti-
cal" four factors-other competitive bicycles were available in the
marketplace, the distributors and retailers handled other brands as
well as Schwinn, the vertical restraints were not improperly inter-
mixed with price fixing and the net effect of the restrictions was to
preserve and not to damage competition in the bicycle market 80
One immediate observation about the foregoing line of cases is
that they have been controversial, even at the Supreme Court level.
In only one of the ten cases-Colgate-did nine Justices adhere to
the opinion of the Court, and the average number of Justices joining
in the majority opinion without concurring opinion in the other
nine cases has been only 5.6.40 A second major consideration is that
87 Id. at 379. (emphasis by the Court.) This was of course dictum, since Schwlnn
had not appealed from the district court's decision on this point.
88 Id. at 880.
39 Id. at 381-82, Schwinn was applied in Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp.,
883 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967), in such a manner as to make unenforceable a
supplier's patents on grounds of patent misuse; the offending provision of the paten.
tee's license agreement restricted the license "to the use of licensed products and/or
sale of licensed products for original installation on . . . equipment manufactured
by or for Caterpillar and sold by ... Caterpillar dealers ... and to use as replacement
parts sold by Caterpillar and Caterpillar dealers . . . for such . . . equipment." Id.
at 263 n. 22.
-0 Positions of the Justices may be tabulated as follows:
Joining in
Majority Not
Without More Dissenting Concurring Participating
Dr. Miles 7 1 1
Colgate 9
Schrader 6 2 1
Frey 6 3
Beech-Nut 5 4
Bausch & Lomb 8 1
Parke, Davis 5 8 1
Simpson 5 3** 1
White 4 3 1 1
Schwinn 5 2* 20 2
* In part
** On procedural grounds
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all of them involved charges of resale price maintenance-even in
Schwinn the government, foreclosed by its appellate strategy from
attacking the district court's finding of no price-fixing, argued that
the customer restriction was "specifically designed to exclude ...
retailers likely to emphasize price competition" [i.e., discount
houses]. 41 While much sophisticated analysis has been utilized in
the Court's handling of the precedents, fact situations and posture of
legal questions presented to it in these cases, a basic consideration is
the fundamental, if fading, distinction between interbrand and in-
trabrand competition. As Mr. Justice Holmes plaintively put it in
dissent, "I cannot see how it is unfair competition to say to those
to whom the respondent sells, and to the world, you can have my
goods only on the terms that I propose, when the existence of any
competition in dealing with them depends on the respondent's
will. '42 Today the dissent has an added social content, arising out of
the advantages to the small retail merchant operating under a "fran-
chise" in competition with "vertically integrated giants". "Through
various forms of franchising, the manufacturer is assured qualified
and effective outlets for his products, and the franchisee enjoys
backing in the form of know-how and financial assistance." 43 But,
with the exception of the brief pause for White Motor, the Su-
preme Court has consistently insisted upon intrabrand competition
among resellers in the cases it has considered.
Response to the articulated premises and reasoning of the Court
in its expansions of the 1960's of antitrust strictures against restric-
tions on purchasers or consignees-Parke, Davis, Simpson and
Schwinn-has been vocal and extended. Parke, Davis has been criti-
cized roundly as crippling or making unintelligible the Colgate doc-
trine; Simpson has been scored as undermining settled principles of
agency-antitrust law; and Schwinn has been condemned as badly
misinterpreting its supposed legal foundation 44 and as further un-
41 Brief for Petitioner at 20, United States v. Arnold. Schwinn & Co.. 388 US.
865 (1967).
42 FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 457 (1922) (dissenting opinion).
43 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 386 (1967) (dissenting
opinion of Stewart, J.).
44 The only authorities relied on by the Court (other than a citation to the Dr.
Miles case, which essentially involved price fixing) were the White Motor case and
the ancient rule against restraints on alienation. In White Motor the Court expressly
refused, to -hold that territorial and customer restrictions were per se unlawful, even
where admittedly accompanied by price-fixing. The Court's scholarship with respect to,
and the present-day relevance of, the law of restraints on alienation has been ques-
tioned. See dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart, Id. at 391-93; Handler, The Twen-
tieth Annual Antitrust Review - 1967, 53 VA. L. Rrv. 1667, 1684-86 (1967).
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justifiably upsetting the long-assumed and sensible principle that
agency arrangements need not be tested by the "rule of reason"
since they do not constitute "contracts, conspiracies or combinations
in restraint of trade.
45
But proceeding on the proposition that the law is what the
Supreme Court says it is, what vertical restrictions may a manu-
facturer seek with respect to price, territory and/or customer? Some
of the approaches to and arguments for permissible restrictions are
discussed below.
Where sales are made to distributors, or direct to retailers, in
contrast to transactions properly characterized as agency or consign.
ment transactions, there is, obviously, considerably less latitude
available to the manufacturer. As articulated in Schwinn, "proper
application of section 1 of the Sherman Act to this problem requires
differentiation between the situation where the manufacturer parts
with title, dominion or risk with respect to the article, and where
he completely retains ownership...-46
Resale price control is of course the area historically most trod.
den. Clearly, the manufacturer may unilaterally establish and publish
suggested resale or list prices.4 Additionally, under Colgate he may,
"without more," announce that he will refuse to deal with anyone
who sells at or advertises prices other than the suggested prices, and
cut off those who do not abide by the policy.48 He may control resale
prices within specified limitations in states where fair trade laws are
still in force. He probably may explain to purchasers the advantage
of following specified resale price schedules, although this practice
approaches the edge of the cliff overlooking "contract, conspiracy or
combination." He may ordinarily control resale prices of goods for
45 "[B]efore Schwinn it was settled law that bona fide agency and consignmtent
arrangements required no justification since they involved no restraints." Handler,
The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review - 1967, 53 VA. L. REv. 1667, 1686 (1967).
46 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1967). The
government did not argue on appeal that the restriction should be per se unlawful
where a resale relationship existed, and the Court did not state why transfer of title
should control the outcome. The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti.
trust Division was later reported as suggesting in a panel discussion that "By and
large [transfer of title] shouldn't make any difference. Beyond a certain point, a
distributor is the same as a salesman, and he should be treated as one," 342 BNA
ATTR A-20 (1968).
47 Absent decree provisions imposed as a remedial device or fictitious pricing or
other deceptive acts.
48 The debate on what life is left in Colgate goes on, revived by the favorable
references to it in the Schwinn opinion. See remarks of panelists in 36 ADA ANTITRuSr
L. J. 84, 87-90 (1967). See generally secondary authorities cited in S. OrrmNiiEISI & G.
WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 445, 461 n. 8 (3d ed. 1968).
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export if there is no adverse effect on interstate or foreign com-
merce.49 He may control resale prices if so permitted under an es-
tablished exemption from the antitrust laws.
Provisions affecting the distributor's territory are judged by less
exacting strictures than those affecting resale price. Clearly, nothing
in Schwinn should preclude a manufacturer from "assigning", in
the sense of "designating", territories (the distributor retaining the
right to sell outside the territory). Similarly, the manufacturer prob-
ably can agree not to appoint another distributor in each "assigned"
territory.50 He may insist that the distributor use his best efforts to
exploit the territory, which he frequently cannot effectively do if
he expends his efforts in forays outside the territory.5 1 He may con-
ceivably provide for pass-over of part of the distributor's gross mar-
gin in the case of sales outside the territory where the magnitude of
the pass-over is not tantamount to a restriction on extending activity
beyond the territorial boundary. This is particularly true where the
prime purpose of the pass-over is to compensate the distributor in
the "invaded" territory for installation and/or service obligations
necessarily incurred. It should be that he can enforce location clauses
49 There is some authority "for concluding that the practice usually would not
sufficiently affect United States foreign trade to come within the Sherman Act:'
FUGATF, FoREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTrrUsr LAWS 106 (1958).
50 See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales
Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiarn, 289 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). (This freedom may be limited if the supplier is
determined to be a monopolist. See Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling
Services, Inc., 383 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1967).)
In Schwinn the Court seemingly acknowledged this principle, except where the
supplier is a monopolist:
[a] manufacturer of a product other and equivalent brands of which are read-
ily available in the market may select his customers, and for this purpose he
may 'franchise" certain dealers to whom, alone, he will sell his goods. Cf.
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 US. 300 (1919). If the restraint stops at
that point - if nothing more is involved than vertical "confinement" of the
manufacturer's own sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, and if com-
petitive products are readily available to others, the restriction, on these
facts alone, would not violate the Sherman Act.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967). But note concurring
opinion of Justice Douglas in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 36 U.S.L.W. 4171, 4173 (U.S.
March 4, 1968): "Whether an exclusive territorial franchise in a vertical arrangement
is per se unreasonable under the antitrust laws is a much mooted question".
51 "Nothing in the Schwinn case precludes the use of an 'area of primary respon-
sibility' policy even where the relationship between manufacturer and distributor or
dealer is based on sales rather than agency." Note, Restrictive Distribution Arrange.
inents After the Schwinn case, 53 CoiLEL. L. Q. 514, 525 (1968). See White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 n.12 (1963) (concurring opinion of Brennan J.).
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such as were upheld in the 1942 Boro Hall case,52 since they are es-
sentially contractual arrangements ancillary to the manufacturer's
right to select dealers, and do not affect the right of the dealer to
sell outside his territory.
Restrictions on the categories of customers to whom the dis-
tributor may sell were characterized by Mr. Justice Brennan in his
concurring opinion in White Motor as being "inherently ... more
dangerous" than territory restrictions. He suggested that they might
merely "codify the economically obvious" if as a practical matter the
distributors could not sell the prohibited accounts. 58 Presumably
the manufacturer may restrict resale customer categories where safe-
ty or other requirements of law would otherwise be violated-e.g.,
the sale of certain drugs to persons other than those authorized by
law to sell or dispense them.5 4 Certain sanctions might be provided-
e.g., return of part of the discount where sales are made to retailers
rather than jobbers, in order to avoid violation of the Robinson.
Patman Act. And the Schwinn case does not really deal with the
situation involved in the intriguing FTC decision in Roux Distrib.
Co.,5" where a complaint attacking customer restrictions was dis-
missed in part on the ground that the two classes of purchasers, drug
wholesalers (who were confined to selling to drug and department
stores) and beauty supply dealers (who were confined to selling to
beauty salons), were not engaged in substantial competition with
each other.
The Schwinn case left open certain questions as to the situations
in which the "per se violation" concept will be applied to vertical
territorial and customer restrictions. First, although the Court did
not emphasize the fact, the basis for its dictum that territorial re-
strictions on a reseller are invalid per se was a district court hold-
ing that such restrictions were invalid where they were imposed as
part of a horizontal arrangement at the distributor level.50
52 Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir, 1942). "Loca-
tion clauses may be necessary. It's one thing if it's a substitution for territorial re-
strictions, but if it's ancillary to an exclusive distributorship that's different, Manu-
facturers need some latitude but we should preclude restrictions that aren't economic-
ally merited." Reported remarks of Mr. Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Antitrust Division, in panel discussion, 542 BNA ATTR A-19 (1968).
55 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963) (concurring opinion).
54 Consider whether the per se rule should apply where the purpose of a restric-
tion is to permit equitable distribution during a period of shortage. Cf. Fosburgh v.
California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 291 F. 29 (9th Cir. 1923).
55 55 F.T.C. 1386 (1959).
56 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 325 (N.D, I11. 1965).
Thus the case might conceivably be read some day as being limited to such fact sltua-
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Another possible area of permissible use of either customer or
territorial restrictions or both has been noted in the peculiar treat-
ment by the Court in Schwinn of the situation of the "struggling
company" or the "newcomer". In White Motor the Court, acknowl-
edging that "We do not know enough of the economic and business
stuff out of which [territorial limitations] emerge to be certain"
that they are "naked restraints of trade with no purpose except sti-
fling of competition," observed that such restrictions "may be allow-
able protections against aggressive competitors or the only practic-
able means a small company has for breaking into or staying in busi-
ness.. ."57 The Court specifically observed in Schwinn that, in its
view, the facts there did not come within these "specific illustra-
tions" of the possible application of the rule of reason adverted to
in White Motor.5  The fact that the Court did not even cite the
Sandura and Snap-On cases 9 lends additional weight to this inter-
pretation. While it seems illogical and discriminatory to permit
"small companies" to use contractual provisions and to deny their
use to other competitors, there is no doubt that courts entertain
favorably this type of argument, presumably on the premise that
competition is increased, rather than restrained, in such situations.
Assuming that such a limitation on the sweep of the Schwinn per
se pronouncements is valid, the usual questions of how small is
small, how long does a newcomer remain a newcomer, etc., will re-
rain for case by case analysis or repronouncement by the courts.
Whether application of the per se violation doctrine stated in
the Schwinn case will be applied in all reseller situations is thus not
completely clear. It is probably accurate to state that until the Simp-
on and Schwinn cases most counsel proceeded on the premise that
restrictions on price, territory and customer category were per se
legal in true consignment or agency arrangements, with no "rule of
reason" justification being necessary. There was always the question
whether the agency or consignment was "bona fide," but the nearly
universal understanding was that a true consignment or agency rela-
tionship made the consignee or agent an arm of the manufacturer
tions, although admittedly some of the language of the opinion is difficult to reconcile
with such a view.
57 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
58 In the Sealy case, decided on the same day as Schwinn, the Court even sug-
gested that a horizontal allocation of territories among small grocers might be just-
fiable. United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967).
59 Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v.
FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). In both cases territorial restrictions were upheld
as reasonable restraints. Further, in Snap-On certain restrictions on customers were
held to amount to at most a de minimis restraint on competition.
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and thus no "contract, conspiracy or combination in restraint of
trade" was present. Now that the Court apparently has changed all
this in Schwinn, and has concluded that consignment or agency
arrangements which contain restrictions on territories or cus-
tomers may constitute "contracts, combinations or conspiracies in re-
straint of trade", the propriety of which is to be judged by applica-
tion of the rule of reason, what standards are available?G0
First, there is doubt that the opinion can be read to permit
application of the rule of reason to price restriction clauses or in
monopoly contexts-the Court said that vertical restrictions are not
per se violations "absent price fixing and in the presence of ade-
quate sources of alternative products to meet the needs of the
unfranchised... ."61 Second, presumably the manufacturer must act
unilaterally and without horizontal "agreement" at the manufacturer
or distributor level. Third, the kinds of business justifications ap-
propriate to establishing that territory and customer restrictions do
not "unreasonably" restrain trade are probably as many and varied
as are the rule of reason cases in the antitrust books. Those which
the Court mentioned as persuasive in Schwinn were: (1) Schwinn
adopted its program "in a competitive situation dominated by mass
merchandisers;" (2) Schwinn's practices did not result in "an
inadequate competitive situation;" and (3) Schwinn's program
did not exceed the limits reasonably necessary "to meet the
competitive problems posed by its more powerful competitors."02
A shorthand version of this might be to say that Schwinn faced
60 One observer has suggested that the bar has over-reached to Schwitih and
that the basic question in this type of case is whether the particular manufacturer
is "dominant": "If you have a dominant position, any kind of restraint, I think, is
going to be looked at very critically by the court. If you do not have a dominant
position the Court is much more likely to treat a greater restraint as one that comes
within exceptions to this per se rule, or is going to treat it differently tnder the
rule of reason. Therefore, I think, from a practical point of view, that the Schwlnn
case really doesn't change very much." Cohen, remarks in panel discussion, 86 ABA
ANTrTRUST L. J. 84, 90 (1967). One critical factor in any such approach of course is
the accordion-like expanse of the imprecise term "dominant."
61 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., S88 U.S. 365, 381 (1967). At an earlier
point in the opinion the Court indicated that where the "function of the dealer in
question [is], in fact, indistinguishable from that of an agent or salesman of the man-
ufacturer, it is only if the impact of the confinement is 'unreasonably' restrictive of
competition that a violation of § 1 results from such confinement, unemcumbercd by
culpable price fixing." Id. at 880. Of course this phrase adds only further confusion,
If the dealer is equivalent in function to a salesman, what conceivable wrong Is there
in setting the price at which he may sell? And if price fixing in such circumstances
is bad only if it is "culpable," what is the content of that fighting term?
62 Id. at 380-81.
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more powerful competitors, did not achieve dominance by its
program and went no further than it had to in imposing restric-
tions. This is a customary rule of reason analysis, and permits
justification in many factual situations. Fourth, it is possible that
the form of the particular arrangement will be decisive. It is un-
fortunate perhaps that for purposes of legal analysis the Schlwinn
case involved a hodge-podge of programs of resale, agency and con-
signment, thus tending to suggest that the actual differences between
them were minor; for example, the government relied in part on a
provision in dealer franchise forms (which were signed by Schwinn,
the distributor and the dealer) that the distributor would act "as an
independent distributor and not as an agent."8 3 Thus a pattern of
distribution limited entirely to persons who are indisputably agents
might be argued to fall outside the bounds of the Schwinn principle.
However, such a view must be characterized as sanguine except in
the case of pure manufacturer's representatives or other agencies
where neither title nor possession is transferred. Finally, a question
might be raised if a manufacturer did not impose restrictions but
simply anounced that he would pay his agent commissions only on
specified sales.64
Permissible areas of restrictive provisions in consignment ar-
rangements are illustrated by selected facts of the Schwinn case it-
self. One year prior to the institution of the Scliwinn marketing pro-
gram it "had the largest single share of the United States bicycle mar-
ket-22.5 percent,"65 and its dollar and unit sales rose substantially
thereafter (although its market share fell to 12.8 percent). It had
reduced the number of retail outlets on its mailing list by two-thirds
and had instituted the practice of franchising approved retail out-
lets. Schwinn had been "firm and resolute" in insisting upon ob-
servance of territorial and customer limitations and its firmness
"was grounded upon the communicated danger of termination."
63 Brief for Petitioner, at 21, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 US.
565 (1967). The Court in Simpson referred to "a so-called retail dealer 'consignment'
agreement," Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 14 (1964) and said that there the
dealers "have all or most of the indida of entrepreneurs, except for price fixing."
Id. at 20. However, the agreements there differed only in minor respects from those
involved in United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), after which many
other agreements have been modelled.
64 A pessimistic view that Schwinn may become a "laboratory specimen," at least
with respect to situations such as that present in Schwinn where a desire of the
manufacturer is to keep the product out of the hands of discounters, is set forth in
Kittelle, Territorial and Customer Restrictions Through Consignment or Agency.
Schwinn or Sin?, 12 ANrrrusr BULL. 1007 (1967).
65 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 368 (1967).
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With all of this, the Court upheld the restrictions.
The conclusions to be drawn from the Schwinn case will no
doubt be various and many. Why the Court suddenly threw terri-
torial and customer resale restrictions into the oblivion of per se
violation doctrine, when a vast amount of literature and evidence
suggested that reasonable justification for restraints exists in many
situations, is a mystery. As stated by Professor Day in 1962, "A re-
view of prior writings discloses that virtually every writer on the
subject of exclusive territory arrangements believes that such distri-
bution arrangements are valid if they do not constitute an attempt
to monopolize or do not unreasonably lessen competition."G0
There were good reasons for this view: (1) the analogies
customarily relied on to attack vertical restrictions67-the analogy to
resale price fixing and the Dr. Miles analogy to horizontal agreement
at the distributor level to allocate territories-are not really appro-
priate in analyzing territory and customer restrictions. Vertical price
restrictions are almost inevitably for the benefit of the distributors, 8
and distributor conspiracies normally have as their main purpose
elimination of competition at that level, whereas territory and cus-
tomer restrictions frequently are designed for the benefit of the
manufacturer to permit his product to compete more effectively
with other brands. As to price maintenance, the restriction normally
would have a tendency to hobble interbrand as well as intrabrand
competition, whereas the principal purpose of territorial and cus-
tomer restrictions is frequently to strengthen and promote inter-
brand competition. (2) There is a host of reasons why in particular
circumstances vertical territory or customer restrictions would be en-
tirely reasonable as restraints of trade, particularly where their net
effect is to promote competition. Examples include the need of non-
dominant firms to attract effective distributors, particularly where
substantial capital commitment at the distributor level is required,
the situation where service is a major or crucial element of market-
ing and interbrand, competition and requires some element of con-
trol by the manufacturer, the need of newcomers and failing manu-
60 Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements under the Antitrust Laws - A Re-
appraisal, 40 N. CAR. L. REv. 223 n. 2 (1962), listing the extensive commentary on the
subject then available. See S. OPPENErIM & G. WrsrON, FF.DERAL ANrTwusr LAws 584
(3rd ed. 1968) for subsequent bibliography.
67 For a discussion of the history of the Department of Justice positions on the
subject, see Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 451
CoRN. L. Q. 254 (1960).
08 However, in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 36 U.S.L.W. 4171 (US, Mardi 4, 1968),
the Court held arrangements affecting maximum resale prices to be within the per se
illegality principle.
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facturing firms to strengthen their competitive positions vis-a-vis
more substantial competitors, the need to keep the product out of
the hands of distributors or dealers who handle it in such a way as
to hurt the public,69 and the situation where the manufacturer's only
practical alternative is vertical integration.70
In the face of all this, the Court in Schwinn merely issued a
flat pronouncement on the per se illegality of post-sale restrictions,
opining that it is unreasonable "without more to seek to restrict and
confine" areas or persons in such cases and that "such restraints are
so obviously destructive of competition that their mere existence is
enough." 7-1 Under these circumstances, it can be predicted that if
application of the flat pronouncements of the Dr. Miles case in 1911
with respect to resale price maintenance is still unclear in 1968 after
a series of interpretative decisions in the interim, the same will be
even more true in the case of vertical territory and customer restric-
tions. Questions as to whether a "contract, combination or conspir-
acy," is present, whether a restriction is present, whether the "per
se" rule of Schwinn really is intended to apply to all such vertical
restrictions, whether the manufacturer has given up the requisite
indicia of ownership, etc., will remain. And in the area of agency
and consignment arrangements, all the additional questions of
whether the Schwinn case applies to particular transactions, and in
any event what factors are appropriate in applying the rule of reason,
will remain. Accordingly, even if ours is not to reason why the Su-
preme Court handled vertical restrictions in the way it did in the
Schwinn case, we can look ahead to years of further uncertainty for
lawyers and businessmen in dealing with the problems of vertical
restrictions.
69 The government noted in arguing the Schwinn case that a manufacturer "has,
we grant, an interest in keeping his product from retail dealers whose methods might
damage the goodwill of the product and thereby hamper him in competing with
other manufacturers. An example would be a retailer who refused to permit damaged
merchandise to be returned:' Brief for Petitioner at 43, 388 U.S. 3S (1967). In one
old case an agreement of the purchaser of stale cigarettes not to resell them in the
United States was upheld in light of the allegation that sale here would injure the
seller's reputation. P. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 280 F. 238 (I.D.NAY 1922).
70 Counsel for Schwinn has stated that "the plain effect of Justice Fortas' opinion
is going to be to force manufacturers like Schwinn to vertically integrate. 'm sure
that it will be no secret when it comes out that Schwinn will vertically integrate."
Remarks of Robert C. Keck in panel discussion, 36 ABA ANTrmusr L J. 95 (1967).
71 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967). The Court
said that the effect of such restrictions in the agency and consignment arrangements
before it "is to preserve and not to damage competition in the bicycle market." Id.
at 382.
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